TEACHING LAW IN THE AGE OF AI

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ABSTRACT:
The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) is profoundly transforming the teaching and learning of Law. This article analyses the roles that AI can play in legal education —as an information retrieval tool, a tutor, and a drafting assistant— and draws consequences for the organisation of undergraduate law programmes. With regard to assessment, the article argues for strengthening oral examinations and excluding the use of AI in graded exercises. On methodology, it proposes reorienting legal education away from the memorisation of rules and towards mastery of normative structures, legal reasoning, and the development of a distinctly legal mindset, using AI as a lever that amplifies existing knowledge. Finally, a curricular proposal is presented that reorganises compulsory subjects around cross-disciplinary and integrative approaches to legal phenomena, reserving the final years for interdisciplinary electives and external placements.

KEY WORDS:
Artificial intelligence – legal education – legal reasoning – law curriculum – teaching methodology

I. Introduction

AI is already bringing about a profound change in our lives. In the literature its impact is compared to that of the Industrial Revolution[1] and the Neolithic Revolution[2]. An encyclical on the subject has just been published[3], and there is scarcely a topic of public debate in which it is not present. There are both utopian and apocalyptic visions. Some dream of the way it might free us from work[4] or enable discoveries that now seem unimaginable[5]; at the same time,

[1]G. Hinton, "AI is the next Industrial Revolution", *Time*, 11 December 2025, https://time.com/7339628/geoffrey-hinton-ai/.
[2]O. Jude, "Revolutions in Human Progress: A Comparative Analysis of the Neolithic, Industrial, and Artificial Intelligence Transformations", *ResearchGate*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383987637_Revolutions_in_Human_Progress_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_the_Neolithic_Industrial_and_Artificial_Intelligence_Transformations.
[3]Leo XIV, Encyclical Letter *Magnifica Humanitas*, 15 May 2026, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/es/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html. The encyclical refers expressly to Rerum Novarum, published by Leo XIII in 1891, which laid the foundations of the social doctrine of the Church. Indeed, Robert Prevost's choice of papal name (Leo) was inspired by Leo XIII, since, in the new Pope's view, the challenges posed by AI are comparable to those brought about by the transformations of industrialisation addressed in Rerum Novarum (E. Belloso, "León XIV y la inteligencia artificial: la cuestión digital", in *Conservad la Alegría*, 17 September 2025, https://www.archisevillasiempreadelante.org/leon-xiv-y-la-inteligencia-artificial-la-cuestion-digital/).
[4]S. Altman, "Moore's Law for Everything", 16 March 2021, https://moores.samaltman.com/.
[5]As early as 2024, the Nobel Prize in Chemistry rewarded an innovation based on AI. See D. Castelvecchi, E. Callaway and D. Kwon, "AI comes to the Nobels: double win sparks debate about scientific fields", *Nature*, 10 October 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-03310-8.

warnings are raised about the threat it may pose to the labour market[6], about its biases[7], or about how it may affect our cognitive capacities[8]. After all, we have long speculated about thinking machines or robots that might end up becoming the masters of humanity; so it is hardly surprising that AI should have so profound an impact on our society.

We do not know where it will take us, but its effects are already beginning to be felt. In our everyday lives it is increasingly common to turn to AI to solve problems or to make enquiries. The number of users of the most popular tool, ChatGPT, reached one billion in the second quarter of 2026, and the remaining platforms (Gemini, Claude, Copilot, DeepSeek, etc.) together account for several hundred million more[9].

AI is also penetrating the economy. Despite the absence —to my knowledge— of global, up-to-date and rigorous studies, I do not think there can be any doubt about the impact it is having across various sectors. With regard to the labour market, for example, as early as 2025 a 6% fall was observed in the hiring of young workers in posts exposed to AI, rising, in the case of programmers, to a fall of 20%[10]. It is true that, alongside these figures, there are studies which take the view that the impact of AI on the labour market is still modest[11]; but we cannot overlook the speed at which AI tools are developing and, above all, the speed at which we are adopting them in our daily work and in our everyday lives.

The legal sector is one of those with significant exposure to AI. More than 10% of the posts held by employees of Clifford Chance in London would reportedly be cut or have their

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[6]E. Brynjolfsson, B. Chandar and R. Chen, "Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence", *Stanford Digital Economy Lab*, 2025, https://digitaleconomy.stanford.edu/publication/canaries-in-the-coal-mine-six-facts-about-the-recent-employment-effects-of-artificial-intelligence/.

[7]See *infra*, section II.1.

[8]M. Gerlich, "AI Tools in Society: Impacts on Cognitive Offloading and the Future of Critical Thinking", *Societies*, 2025, 15(1), https://doi.org/10.3390/soc15010006. See also A. López-Tarruella Martínez, "La incidencia de la inteligencia artificial en la docencia del derecho (internacional privado)", forthcoming (by courtesy of the author), no. 4, with further references. The author argues that, in this situation, the teacher must foster an appropriate use of AI (*ibidem*, no. 6).

[9]"ChatGPT supera a Gemini, Copilot y Perplexity en usuarios mensuales: Los detalles", *Gestión*, 4 June 2026, https://gestion.pe/tecnologia/chatgpt-supera-a-gemini-copilot-y-perplexity-en-usuarios-mensuales-los-detalles-noticia/.

[10]N. Richardson, "Yes, AI is affecting employment. Here's the data", *ADP Research*, 26 August 2025, https://www.adpresearch.com/main-street-macro/yes-ai-is-affecting-employment-heres-the-data.

[11]Y. Bengio, *International AI Safety Report. First Key Update. Capabilities and Risk Implications*, October 2025, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.13653, pp. 18-19.

functions modified as a consequence of AI[12]. Consultancy firms, too, appear likely to reduce hiring as a result of AI[13], while the use of AI in the legal sector continues to grow[14].

AI also has a significant bearing on education. UNESCO has already addressed the matter[15], and questions are being raised about how AI is to be integrated into the various stages of education. As a law teacher, over the past two years I have witnessed the rapid introduction of AI, on the part of both teachers and students. The preparation of classes, the drafting of practical cases, the search for materials, the production of assignments, the revision of texts, dishonest practices in assessment exercises… almost every task connected with teaching and learning is being affected by the use of AI.

This article puts forward a proposal as to how undergraduate law studies might be adapted to the demands of AI. To that end, I shall first examine the roles that AI can play in the learning process and then project these ideas onto legal studies. Here I shall begin with questions of assessment, before turning to teaching methodology and a proposed distribution of subjects.

This is, of course, a tentative reflection, but one that seeks to serve as a basis for a debate which I believe to be necessary on how law faculties are to adapt to the possibilities and challenges of AI.

II. AI and learning

1. AI as a search engine

In the second half of 2024, many people discovered that there existed a tool, ChatGPT, presented as an artificial intelligence (AI) with which one could interact using natural language. Expectations were high; after roughly a year of gradual introduction to the general public,

[12]J. Morell, "Primeras señales del impacto de la IA en el sector legal", *Abogacía Española*, 1 December 2025, https://www.abogacia.es/publicaciones/blogs/blog-de-innovacion-legal/primeras-senales-del-impacto-de-la-ia-en-el-sector-legal/.
[13]*Ibidem*.
[14]According to the Clio Legal Trends Report, 79% of legal professionals in the United States reportedly use AI (*ibidem*).
[15]UNESCO, *AI and education: Protecting the rights of learners*, Paris, 2025, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000395373; UNESCO, *AI and the future of education. Disruptions, dilemmas and directions*, Paris, 2025, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000395236.

people with no special technical knowledge —and who were not technology enthusiasts either— began to incorporate this new instrument into their everyday tasks.

For many, the initial point of entry —apart from experiments such as asking it to compose a poem or to answer apparently profound questions— was to replace, wholly or partly, search engines of the Google or Yahoo type. The advantage of AI tools was that there was no need to translate the search one had in mind into specific words or phrases deemed significant; instead, one could ask the AI directly for what one wished to find.

This probably changed the way searches were carried out on the Internet, but it also had a further effect: the AI not only located the links but could also summarise their content, so that the user might make do with the AI's summary and not access the requested page or pages in person. As is well known, this already affects digital media, which have lost interactions — something that bears upon their revenue and even upon their business model[16].

From the perspective of someone accessing ChatGPT, or one of the tools that soon began to compete with it, the original material was to a large extent replaced by the AI's interpretation of that material. This possibility connected naturally with another early use of AI that some platforms had already begun to experiment with: the production of summaries and analyses of documents[17]. Such summaries did not necessarily entail dispensing with consultation of the original text, but, in so far as they were sufficiently detailed, they could serve to guide the reading of lengthy works. In this way, artificial intelligence tools proved useful not only for searches on the Internet but also for searches within a document or a set of documents. Indeed, some products have been developed precisely for working with materials supplied by the user, avoiding consultation of the web —which, in principle, might prevent the introduction of false or misleading information[18].

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[16]See, for example, N. Newman, Journalism and Technology. Trends and Predictions 2026, *Reuters Institute/University of Oxford*, DOI: 10.60625/risj-ps1d-np11, pp. 10-14.

[17]Academia (Academia.edu) was already using artificial intelligence tools in its products in 2024 (T. Rose, "How the Academia.edu Edtech Platform is Leveraging AI/ML to Enhance Its Product Line", *Built In*, 7 November 2024, https://www.builtinsf.com/articles/how-academia-edtech-leveraging-aiml-enhance-its-product-lines). Semantic Scholar had begun introducing automatic article summaries as early as 2020 (K. Hao, "An AI helps you summarize the latest in AI", *MIT Technology Review*, 18 November 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/18/1012259/ai-summarizes-science-papers-ai2-semantic-scholar/).

[18]See, as early as 2020, P. Lewis et al., "Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks", *arXiv*:2005.11401, https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.11401. On the educational use of NotebookLM and the advantages of closed AI systems over open ones for avoiding hallucinations, see, for example, E. Tufino, "NotebookLM as a Socratic physics tutor: Design and preliminary observations of a RAG-based tool", *arXiv*:2504.09720, https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09720.

Over time, both functions of AI (global searching of the web and searching within a defined set of documents) came to complement one another. To this was added the possibility of organising specific searches within particular databases, platforms or websites, so that the location and organisation of information could be entrusted to the AI tool, avoiding distortions and guiding the final result.

In other words, the introduction of AI as a locator of information moved from being a mere substitute for traditional search engines to displacing, to a large extent, the direct reading of materials (replaced by the summaries produced by AI tools), and finally to becoming an agent that simplifies searches within closed environments such as legal databases.

The consequence is a change in both the procedure and the results of searching —not only because of the technical differences between classic search engines and AI tools, to which reference has already been made, but because biases operate differently. In the case of search engines, it is well known that payment could secure a better position in the search results[19], and this is not the only example of bias[20]. In the case of AI, it is known that biases exist in the location and presentation of information[21], and that, moreover, such biases are probably harder to identify than in the case of traditional search engines. The further difficulty is that such biases derive, to a large extent, from those already present in society and are transferred to AI through the data fed into it[22]. This leads us to an even deeper question: whether AI is to be an instrument of social transformation, a mere reflection of existing society, or whether, ultimately, it may become an instrument that reinforces the social arrangements and structures from which it draws. This is a question that we shall not, however, address here; for present purposes, it is enough to have raised it.

2. AI as a tutor

In recent years, AI has shown itself to be not only a substitute for traditional search engines (with the qualifications set out in the preceding section) but has also become a teacher

[19]See Articles 26 and 39 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), *OJ* L 277, 27 October 2022, which require transparency in advertising.
[20]See, for example, S.U. Noble, *Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism*, New York, New York University Press, 2018.
[21]See E.M. Bender et al., "On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?", *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '21)*, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445922, pp. 610-623, at pp. 614-618.
[22]*Ibidem*, pp. 614-615.

or, if one prefers, a tutor. One of the habitual uses of AI, probably derived from its use as a search engine, is as a tool for answering queries, or as an instrument that enables the understanding and learning of certain matters. It is, as just noted, a natural evolution from the search engine, once one moves from asking for the sources to reading the summary that the AI makes of those sources.

This tutoring role unfolds across the most diverse fields. We have surely all had the experience of solving a problem with the computer, the car or the washing machine by asking AI. It is also used to guide us through bureaucratic labyrinths, or to work out the procedure to be followed before a particular administrative body.

Alongside this everyday or domestic use of AI as a substitute for reading instruction manuals or the most varied tutorials, we also find a use in learning. AI can be a private tutor available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, with the capacity to repeat as many times as necessary the answer to a query in algebra, physics, biology or literature, adapting, moreover, the level to what the student requires. The way in which these tools are changing learning has not yet been the subject of thorough and rigorous studies —which makes sense, given that it is a very recent phenomenon and that there has therefore been no real time to conduct lengthy studies, analyse the results, cross-check them and publish them. What we can say about this form of using AI comes from direct contact with students and teachers, which makes it possible to observe how students ask ChatGPT, Gemini or Claude to do their schoolwork for them, to produce summaries, to solve problems, or —more frequently, perhaps, than is sometimes thought— to help them understand what the teacher had explained in a confused or hurried manner in class.

Beyond the foregoing, AI can also be used for self-directed learning, by adolescents and young people as well as by adults. In March 2026, Professor Jesús Fernández-Villaverde posted on X about how he had studied, over the course of a weekend, the work of the sociologist Erving Goffman[23]. In the post he explained the method he had followed, starting from an initial programme drawn up by Claude and proceeding from there to read selected parts of the sociologist's works, completing his study with questions put to Claude on specific topics or connecting Goffman with other authors. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde's conclusion was that, after that weekend, he was not an expert on Goffman, but that he did have the level that a master's student might acquire after devoting a week to the subject. This is surely a shared experience, and I myself use artificial intelligence tools to learn about fields outside my own

[23] https://x.com/JesusFerna7026/status/2036162175325065281?s=20. The post is dated 23 March.

area of specialisation, being able to learn in hours or days what, through traditional methods, might take weeks or months.

From this perspective of study, AI tools incorporate a further advantage: they can access materials in any language and offer either a complete version of the work in a different language (which usually takes some time) or a summary or treatment of the problems addressed and conclusions reached, in whatever language is requested, almost instantaneously. This evidently broadens the range of materials and perspectives that may be used in forming one's own thinking, which potentially leads to better results than those attainable through traditional methods.

Today, moreover, AI tools are no longer confined to producing text-based answers; they are also capable of generating podcasts, presentations or animated graphics according to the needs of the explanation. No advanced knowledge is required for this, since the tools themselves, in the course of their interaction with the user, suggest which "artefacts" may be helpful in aiding the understanding of the topic in question.

That said, one must be aware that AI cannot, on its own, direct the learning of either children or adults. On the one hand, one must recall the biases referred to in the preceding section, which will likewise be carried over into the role of AI as a tutor. A critical approach is indispensable, as is shown, for example, by the experience of Jesús Fernández-Villaverde recounted a little earlier. He explains how he verified the AI's answers and cross-checked them —in that particular case, with the result of a very high degree of agreement with what could be drawn from other sources, though without this implying that the task of cross-checking may be dispensed with. This need for a critical approach is present in the OECD report on the use of AI in teaching[24]. This critical perspective must be maintained both on account of the phenomenon of hallucinations in tools of this kind[25] and on account of the biases discussed above.

[24]"What should teachers teach and students learn in a future powerful AI?", *Education Spotlights*, no. 20, OECD, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/ca56c7d6-en, p. 4, where, in the section on the objectives of science education in the context of a future powerful AI, the following is included: "Teach students to understand AI as a set of tools with specific capabilities and limitations, helping them understand how technology works, when and to what degree it should be trusted, and develop the competency to use it safely and ethically". See also *OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026: Exploring Effective Uses of Generative AI in Education*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/062a7394-en, p. 14.

[25]See A. Alansari and H. Luqman, "Large Language Models Hallucination: A Comprehensive Survey", *arXiv*:2510.06265, which devotes particular attention to hallucinations in the handling of legal questions (p. 6).

On the other hand, AI, on its own, "does nothing". That is to say, it will answer the questions put to it, or complete the tasks assigned to it, but it is necessary that the user have some kind of knowledge of the field being entered, for otherwise they will not even know which questions are possible. The greatest challenge facing the projection of AI onto teaching is probably the identification of the knowledge and skills that users must develop in order to use AI tools as efficiently as possible. In a sense, AI is a lever, which will be the more powerful the greater the weight (knowledge) placed at one of its ends and the longer the arm of that lever (the skill in using AI correctly). To continue the simile: if AI is used from a starting point at which knowledge is high and competence in using AI is great, the final result will be more significant than when the initial knowledge is small and the skill in using the tool is scant.

3. AI as a drafter

AI tools are also used for drafting the most varied texts. Today, it is enough to give a few instructions for the drafting of a letter or email, a summary, the resolution of a practical case or a draft study to be produced by the AI in whatever language is requested. It can also translate texts, surpassing the already high standards reached by automatic translation tools that had been under development for years[26]. Indeed, progress in translation was decisive for the development of AI[27], for the essence of AI is, precisely, language —to the point that it is language which makes it possible to develop other dimensions of AI (images, for example)[28].

AI also allows the revision and correction of texts. Unlike traditional proofreading tools, each correction is accompanied (if the user so requests) by the necessary grammatical and orthographic explanations. It can also polish style, detect repetitions, suggest changes to the structure of texts, or help to design the outline of a piece of work or study. Obviously, it is the user who must decide; but, with AI in this role, the user has an interlocutor offering a point of view that may enrich those the writer holds from other sources.

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[26]On the evolution of machine translation systems, from the 1950s to the present day, see Y. Yuna and J. Song, "Neural Machine Translation and Multilingual NLP: A Survey of Methods, Architectures, and Applications", Preprints.org, 6 January 2026, https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202601.0244, pp. 2-3.

[27]See D. Ataman et al., "Machine Translation in the Era of Large Language Models: A Survey of Historical and Emerging Problems", *Information*, 2025, 16(9), https://doi.org/10.3390/info16090723, p. 1.

[28]See A. Radford et al., "Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision", *arXiv*:2103.00020v1, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2103.00020.

As we shall see in relation to legal studies, this potential of AI is of singular importance. It is, moreover, the one most readily used to circumvent genuine learning; for if one replaces the work of writing for oneself with a commission to the AI, it will not be possible to attain the levels of competence that would be reached through learning in which AI was excluded[29]. This may, naturally, represent a significant handicap for the student; for, as we have seen, the benefit obtained will be directly proportional to the knowledge the user possesses. AI is a multiplier; but if what one seeks to multiply is zero, the result will always likewise be zero.

From this perspective, even an auxiliary use of AI as a mere grammar and spelling checker may prove counter-productive if it translates into carelessness in writing, or if one relies on the fact that there will be a later revision to remove any errors that may have crept in. Obviously, where the purpose is not learning, the use of AI's drafting capabilities entails a considerable saving of time and, as noted, a potential enrichment of the text. Its academic use might be the equivalent of teamwork between a senior researcher and a more junior one, which is by no means unusual in certain university cultures[30].

At this point it must be mentioned that AI also affects post-university training; that is to say, in the legal field, the process followed by graduates when they join law firms. Traditionally, it is the more junior lawyers who produce the written work that is then supervised by more experienced lawyers or partners. Thus, the work begins as that of a drafter and ends as that of a reviewer. Today, that initial drafting can to a large extent be entrusted to AI tools —some of them specifically legal and offering remarkable results. As a consequence, the review carried out by more experienced lawyers and partners is performed more on the texts prepared by the AI than on those drafted by the more junior lawyers. In this way, the learning process in the professional world is likewise altered.

[29]See, along these lines, C. Gallent-Torres, A. Zapata-González and J.L. Ortego-Hernando, "El impacto de la inteligencia artificial generativa en educación superior: una mirada desde la ética y la integridad académica", *RELIEVE. Revista Electrónica de Investigación y Evaluación Educativa*, 2023, vol. 29, no. 2, https://doi.org/10.30827/relieve.v29i2.29134, p. 9.

[30]See U. Wilksmann and O. Wagner, "Theoretical and empirical approach to how professorship is organized in the German higher education system and how the organizational process works", *Higher Education*, 2024 (88), pp. 1463-1482, esp. p. 1464.

III. Legal studies and AI

1. Assessment

Usually, in any work concerning education, the section on assessment appears towards the end. Here, however, we shall begin with it, since assessment has been precisely the first domain in which AI has "irrupted" into academic life —at least in my own direct experience, confined to Law and, essentially, to my own university, the UAB. I imagine, however, that similar problems have arisen at other universities[31]. To gauge the impact of AI, we shall need to distinguish between the various types of assessable activity. This we shall do in what follows. The first warning sign came with the Final Degree Projects (Trabajos Final de Grado, TFG). The TFG is a written piece of work, produced under the supervision of a teacher and subsequently presented before a panel of several teachers, distinct from the one who acted as its supervisor. At my Faculty, the written work may be worth up to a maximum of 7 points, and the defence is marked out of 3. It is clear, therefore, that the weight of the written work is far greater than that of the oral presentation and defence.

Obviously, the use of AI may distort the assessment of the written work. As we have seen, AI can draft a text directly, or revise and structure an earlier draft. In these conditions, verifying which part of the work may be attributed to the student and which part to AI tools becomes problematic. It must be stressed, moreover, that we are dealing not with a scientific study (although it may include —as occasionally happens— original contributions that could be the subject of publication) but with an academic exercise whose purpose is to verify the student's learning. For this reason, if the final result cannot be attributed to the student, there is no point in assessing it.

From here, the difficulty is that it is hard to establish beyond doubt that the work has been produced with the help of AI. Unlike what happens with the tools that make it possible to identify plagiarism, in the case of AI there are no reliable instruments that allow its use to be ascertained[32]. At most there may be suppositions; but such suppositions ought not to be

[31]For a more general reflection on the relationship between AI and assessment, see Th. Corbin and Ph. Dawson, "Talk is cheap: why structural assessment changes are needed for a time of GenAI", *Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education*, 2025, no. 7, pp. 1087-1097, https://doi.org/10.1080/02602938.2025.2503964.

[32]See Q. Guan and Y. Han, "From AI to authorship: Exploring the use of LLM detection tools for calling on 'originality' of students in academic environments", *Innovations in Education and Teaching International*, 2025, 62:5, pp. 1514-1528, at p. 1522, which reports that, in a test on 78 works produced by humans and 78 written with the help of ChatGPT, 53 of the human-authored works were classified

sufficient to justify a negative assessment for the use of AI without solid corroboration which, at least at present, does not appear to exist.

In light of the above, it is difficult to justify the assessment of written work. As regards the TFG, the proposal would be for the assessment to fall on the oral defence of the work, which would be consistent with the view of AI as an enhancer of learning[33]. If the student has used AI to draft the work and has employed it to broaden their knowledge of the topic of the TFG, then in the oral defence they will be able to demonstrate their competence. From this perspective, the use of AI will have served to improve the student's capabilities; but only through conversation or debate with the assessing teachers will it be possible to ascertain that competence[34]. In any event, the oral examination makes it possible to test the student's real competence, confronting them with the need to resolve problems or queries on the spot, and thereby revealing not only what is known but also how it is known.

Turning to another type of assessment exercise, the resolution of practical cases, we find that the advances of AI have led to a situation in which common tools such as ChatGPT, Gemini or Claude are now capable of resolving legal practical cases fairly correctly. As a consequence, allowing the use of AI in the resolution of practical cases will not make it possible to determine the students' real level of competence, since, without any capacity of their own, the AI can supply the correct solution and even introduce nuances that, a few years ago, were reserved for the best students.

The route of complicating the cases so as to make it harder for AI tools to resolve them is not a realistic solution[35]. In my own experience, within a few months the capacity of general-

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as written with the help of ChatGPT, while of the 78 written with ChatGPT, 7 were classified as human-made. Moreover, it is always possible to modify the text obtained from the AI tool in order to hinder its detection (see K. Krishna et al., "Paraphrasing evades detectors of AI-generated text, but retrieval is an effective defense", *arXiv*:2303.13408v2). The imperfection of AI-use detection tools is also stressed by G.J. Curtis ("The two-lane road to hell is paved with good intentions: why an all-or-none approach to generative AI, integrity and assessments is insupportable", *Higher Education Research & Development*, vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 2151-2158, https://doi.org/10.1080/07294360.2025.2476516, at p. 2156), although this author does consider them useful when combined with other factors.

[33]C. Górriz López ["Condicionantes de la modificación del plan de estudios del grado en derecho" (forthcoming, by courtesy of the author), section 5] likewise argues for increasing the weight of oral assessment. See also H. Balalle and S. Pannilage, "Reassessing academic integrity in the age of AI: A systematic literature review on AI and academic integrity", *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 2025, vol. 11, 101299, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.101299, p. 9, and the references cited therein.

[34]See, to the same effect, A. López-Tarruella Martínez, *loc. cit.*, no. 12.

[35]For a different approach, see A. López-Tarruella Martínez, *loc. cit*., no. 17. Already in 2023 it was noted that the route of "complicating" the exercises would have "a short shelf life" given the advances of AI (see C. Gallent-Torres, A. Zapata-González and J.L. Ortego-Hernando, *loc. cit*., p. 12).

purpose AI tools to resolve practical cases has improved appreciably. Even cases involving nuances could be resolved brilliantly by these tools.

Thus, the only way to ascertain the students' genuine ability to resolve practical cases is to prohibit the use of AI for these tasks. This prohibition sits uneasily with the fact that, in professional life, such use of AI does indeed exist; but the fact that training is oriented towards the profession does not mean anticipating the entire context and means of that profession. In order to develop the competences that will, in future, make it possible to review case resolutions produced by AI and to formulate the appropriate questions to obtain the maximum benefit from these instruments, it is necessary that, during the training stage, students develop judgement of their own. The existence of such judgement cannot be assessed if the student is permitted to use AI in assessment exercises, and so this tool ought to be prohibited in the resolution of practical cases that bear on the final mark.

In reality, we face nothing other than a learning process in which one begins with the less complex tools before moving on to the more advanced ones —not only in case the latter should be unavailable, but because in this way one acquires the judgement needed to evaluate the results they yield. At naval academies, for example, celestial navigation continues to be taught[36], and medical students are still required to demonstrate that they know the morphology and structure of the human body. In their study they may use AI, but in the examination they must show that they know the material[37]. AI must not be an excuse for knowing less, but a means of integrating and applying knowledge better[38].

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[36]At the United States Naval Academy (Annapolis), celestial navigation was removed from the curriculum and had to be reintroduced some years later, once it was found that a loss of competence occurred when only electronic navigation was known (see T. Prudente, "Naval Academy reinstates celestial navigation", *Military Times*, 1 November 2015, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2015/11/01/naval-academy-reinstates-celestial-navigation/). The point is not merely to retain the ability to navigate should electronic navigation be unavailable, but also to have a means of cross-checking the data provided by GPS-based systems. See also, to this effect, J.J. Escobar, "Bring Celestial Navigation into the 21st Century", *U.S. Naval Institute*, December 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/december/bring-celestial-navigation-21st-century.

[37]Order ECI/332/2008 of 13 February, establishing the requirements for the verification of official university degrees qualifying for the practice of the profession of Physician (*BOE*, 15 February 2008), requires knowledge of "the morphology, structure and function of the skin, the blood, and the circulatory, digestive, locomotor, reproductive, excretory and respiratory systems; the endocrine system, the immune system and the central and peripheral nervous system".

[38]Without leaving the field of anatomy, see, for example, D.S. Barry et al., "The Clinical Anatomy and Imaging Laboratory: Vertical Integration in the Preclerkship Curriculum", *MedEdPORTA*L, 15 May 2019, https://www.mededportal.org/doi/10.15766/mep_2374-8265.10824; H. Abdellatif *et al*., "Teaching, Learning and Assessing Anatomy with Artificial Intelligence: The Road to a Better Future", *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 31 October 2022, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9656803/.

The foregoing does not mean that AI may not be used in the process of study. On the contrary, the responsible use of AI in the learning phase will enhance the student's capabilities if they employ it to understand better the logic of the various institutions and the problems they raise in practice. In this way, the student must be in a position to resolve the practical cases put to them without needing to resort to these tools. Once that ability has been proven, in the professional sphere they will be able to use them in order to perform to a higher standard.

As regards written examinations, AI has introduced certain problems by facilitating certain dishonest practices. By means of a mobile telephone with Internet access, a student may gain access to their personal account on any AI tool into which the materials of the subject under assessment have previously been fed. If the student can take a photograph of the examination (multiple-choice, short-answer, long-answer, etc.), the AI can then return the answers, which the student will copy from the mobile telephone with ease. Obviously, the student will have to keep the telephone hidden; but there is no doubt that it will be easier for them to "cheat" than when they had to resort to the traditional crib sheet. Nor can we rule out that the telephone may even be outside the room (or in the student's bag), since, by means of earpieces (ever smaller and easier to conceal), the student may issue instructions to the telephone, which can supply the answers even orally.

At my university, the intensification of dishonest practices in assessment has caused concern among teachers and students alike, the latter being affected by "unfair competition" on the part of those who use AI tools to falsify their academic results. As a result of this concern, specific instructions have been issued by the Faculty administration to ensure adequate invigilation in examinations.

In my view, the best solution to problems of this kind is recourse to oral examinations. In an oral examination one can perceive, more clearly than in written tests, not only the student's level of knowledge but also the "shape" of that knowledge: what is known "by heart" but without clear understanding; in which respects there is full assimilation of the principles underlying the rules; the way in which theory and practice are connected, and so forth — dishonest practices being, moreover, far more difficult.

This type of examination, furthermore, would connect naturally with a form of learning that would have to be oriented towards a higher level of competence than in the pre-AI era. As explained in the preceding section, AI is a lever that enhances the assimilation of knowledge. The challenge —which we shall take up in the next section— is to determine how university teaching is to be oriented so as to exploit the full potential of these tools. If that objective is achieved, assessment will no longer seek to determine whether certain content has been

memorised, but whether the student has come to grasp that deep understanding of legal dynamics which makes it possible to approach, however tentatively, any legal problem. Assessment of this kind is more readily carried out through the oral examination, in which the teacher can question and re-question, ask for clarifications, or pose challenges on the spot in order to test the depth of the student's understanding.

Thus, as we have seen, with regard to assessment the consequences to be drawn are, on the one hand, the need to strengthen the oral dimension and, on the other, that the use of AI must be excluded from assessment processes. What is at stake in the latter is ascertaining the level of understanding attained and the capacity to pose and resolve legal problems. In the next section we shall address how AI is to be employed so that the level attained by the student is the highest possible.

2. Methodology

A) What to study

The starting point, consistent with what has been explained so far, is that at the present time there is less sense in studying rules than in recognising and understanding structures. This implies a significant methodological shift in the teaching of law.

Up to the present, and since the nineteenth century, as a consequence —in all likelihood— of codification, it has been assumed that the core of legal training is the learning of the rules. Knowledge of the code (or codes) was to be sufficient for legal practice, complemented by the study of the various interpretations given by the courts. In Common Law systems the order was reversed, given the importance of that Common Law, identified through the interpretation carried out by the courts.

As we shall see, this approach to the study of law is also projected onto the curriculum; but for now let us simply note that legal training is based on the study of legal rules. This has led to a study that is essentially memory-based, which it has been sought to complement through the development of practical exercises including the commentary of judicial decisions or administrative rulings (those of the DGRN or of the Directorate-General for Taxation, for example), the drafting of documents (contracts, for example) or the production of legal opinions.

Today, given the ease with which, through AI, one may access not only the content of the rules but also their projection onto the various practical situations, the purpose of learning law ought to be oriented essentially towards three objectives:

- (a) that students should know the structure of the legal order;
- (b) that they should master legal argumentation;
- (c) that they should be able to approach legal problems with the mindset proper to a jurist.

The last point, that of the jurist's mindset, is important and calls for some explanation. The way in which problems are analysed from the standpoint of Law differs from that of other disciplines. Thus, in the first place, the legal mindset cannot tolerate contradictions. Whereas in other branches of knowledge it is possible to maintain reasonable doubts, provided the theoretical framework explains most phenomena sufficiently well, in law inconsistencies or contradictions must always find a solution. This leads to reasoning built up from the concrete detail, which obliges one constantly to question and qualify the frame of reference or reasoning —a feature that introduces a substantial difference with respect to fields of knowledge such as physics or history.

In the second place, and in connection with the foregoing, reasonable doubt is of greater importance from a legal standpoint than in other fields of knowledge. Absolute certainty does not exist in law either; but neither is it possible to leave a doubt unanswered: questions cannot remain open. This does not mean that there is no debate as to what the correct answer is, but it is inconceivable that there should be no answer —which likewise marks an essential difference from the "hard" sciences.

These two features set the legal mindset apart from the one that is useful in other disciplines. There is a third element, essential to the legal approach to reality, which, however, does come closer to what is usual in other disciplines. In Law, reasoning proceeds from certain premises (the legitimacy, for example, of validly enacted laws), which may be called into question; though here, as a rule, such questioning is not done in a vacuum, but requires that alternative principles be proposed in place of those being challenged. It is true that, unlike disciplines such as physics, in the case of Law the test is not factual (the observables) but evaluative; but even so this last point is structurally equivalent to the reasoning from first principles that is usual in the sciences. In any event, however, the debate about the legitimacy of those first principles must be conducted in accordance with the specifically legal way of reasoning.

It is by this route that the specificity of the legal mindset connects with legal reasoning. The rules of this specific way of debating and constructing discourse in law are of fundamental

importance, including in the codified law that has prevailed over the last two centuries. After all, legal rules must be projected onto reality, and that projection is never wholly automatic or self-evident; it is legal reasoning that allows general rules to become particular rules in relation to concrete acts[39]. Mastery of legal reasoning is achieved through the resolution of the problems that arise in the various sectors of the law. There are, of course, certain common elements, but also many nuances in specific fields. Thus, for example, the principle in dubio pro reo is proper to criminal law, although it also has a projection in other areas (administrative penalty law); the principle whereby the validity of legal transactions is to be favoured operates in the civil and commercial sphere, though it may have exceptions in consumer cases; and so on, through a long series of cases and exceptions, difficult or impossible to systematise or rationalise, which gradually shape the jurist's way of reasoning.

Under the proposal made here, legal reasoning will begin to be taught when there is as yet no knowledge of the substantive content of the legal order. The idea is to resort to concrete, canonical cases in order to introduce the student to the legal way of reasoning. The cases that appear will not be intended to teach the branch of the legal order in question; rather, they must serve to lay the foundations of legal reasoning, so that they may later be embedded in the study of the various sectors of the legal order.

The other element necessary in the training of the jurist is knowledge of the various spheres of rule-creation; that is, the structures that articulate rules, courts, public authority and private actors. Knowledge of the legal "map" is also essential in order to operate as a jurist. That is why one of the objectives of legal studies must be to ensure that students know where rules are created and how they interrelate, at the State level as well as the European, supra-State and private levels. We shall examine this in greater detail when we come to the proposed curriculum.

B) How to study

On the basis of the foregoing, it must be determined how students can be brought to know the various normative structures, to master argumentation in Law, and to assume the specific mindset that characterises jurists. These three tasks must be accomplished within the

[39]The literature on legal argumentation is inexhaustible, but if I had to choose a single work it would be R. Alexy, *Teoría de la argumentación jurídica* (trans. M. Atienza and I. Espejo), Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1989.

period of the law degree (four years), and to achieve this AI is indispensable, if the mastery attained by students is to be high.

AI will make it possible to deepen the analysis of concrete problems and to provide appropriate teaching materials; but guidance will be needed, and that will fall to the teachers. That is to say, the latter must be able to indicate which specific tasks and exercises are to be carried out in order gradually to achieve mastery of legal technique.

In any event, it would be for the teachers to set out to students the objectives of knowledge and competence they should attain in sequence. Thus, at a first stage, the aim would be to identify the major areas of Law and their essential function, to recognise the types of legal arguments employed, and to be able to distinguish between a legal and a non-legal treatment of a given problem.

In all these tasks AI, as I have said, can be of help, and it is to be expected that it will intensify and accelerate the learning process. Thus, it can serve to produce outlines and concept maps, or to resolve the doubts that may arise in the study of the materials. In the same vein, it can, in relation to a single problem, exemplify different types of reasoning (legal, moral, philosophical). In any event, it is important to recall that this assistance must lead to genuine understanding and knowledge on the student's part, because in the assessment they will no longer have the help of AI.

At a second stage, the aim would be no longer to identify the major areas of Law, but the principal problems within each of those areas. Thus, whereas at a first stage the aim would be to distinguish criminal law from civil, administrative or private international law, at a second stage the student should become familiar with the various fields within each major block. The distinction between contractual and non-contractual obligations, between company law and securities-market law, between international jurisdiction and applicable law, between administrative procedure and the regime of administrative penalties (to give some examples bearing on civil, commercial, private international and administrative law) should be introduced naturally. As can be seen, the aim is always to take a relational and structural approach, which is possible because the details of the regulation could be obtained instantaneously by means of AI tools. That is to say, the student can be set complex problems in the knowledge that, in resolving them, they will have the support of AI. Thus, for example, they may be set a comparative study of the protection afforded to the consumer and to the investor, being asked to show the interactions between consumer legislation and capital-markets legislation. Likewise, they may be asked to develop the principle of *non bis in idem* taking into account the relationships between criminal proceedings and administrative penalty

proceedings. The volume of information they must handle will be accessible thanks to AI, since it can help them locate the relevant decisions of the various courts (including the European Court of Human Rights and the Luxembourg Court) and organise the existing legislative, doctrinal and case-law materials.

At a different point, the student would already be in a position to resolve real or simulated legal problems. Once a sufficient picture of the legal phenomenon as a whole has been attained, it is possible to descend to concrete problems because, as I have anticipated, the specific rules, the case law and the major doctrinal lines are fairly accessible. The assignments set by the teachers (how might one obtain a declaration that a contract is void? how is one to prevent the enforcement in Spain of a decision handed down abroad? what can be done where the joint holder of a bank account empties it without the consent of the other holder?) will have to be tackled by the students of necessity from a plural perspective, one that transcends the compartmentalisation derived from traditional study programmes. By this point, moreover, they will already have become familiar with the legal use of AI, and will be able to employ it in the same way as a professional does.

It is worth pausing on the intrinsic cross-disciplinary character of the training that runs through the whole proposal. We have seen how a certain compartmentalisation has come about in the teaching of Law, in part as a consequence of the methodological consensus consolidated after codification, according to which legal competence is acquired by studying and knowing the legal rules; on the basis of which legal studies are compartmentalised into distinct areas, so that the teachers of each of them teach a particular part of the legal order. Teachers are either teachers of civil law or of commercial law, of administrative law or of labour law. That specific perspective means that legal problems are approached, initially, from a particular point of view, and that, at most, others are added almost as ancillary elements. This does not correspond to legal reality, in which the superimposition of planes is constant; but the difficulty we have faced hitherto is that it is not possible to keep abreast of the whole legal order, so that specialisation prevails.

Today, however, thanks to AI, it is easier to acquire a certain knowledge of a sector of the legal order other than one's own specialisation. Of course, specialisation will continue to exist, but communication between the different branches of law will be easier, because the jurist will be able to acquire the basic knowledge and competences of another sector of the legal order relatively quickly when needed. Projected onto legal training, this means that interdisciplinarity ought to be increased, especially as the degree progresses, the ideal being

that the final year should be devoted to exercises and placements that require the simultaneous consideration of different branches of the legal order.

As the student advances in their studies, therefore, the concurrence of perspectives in the problems analysed must increase. Likewise, as legal knowledge and competence grow, the role of the student's personal initiative in their training should become greater. Whereas in the early years it will be the questions posed or proposed by the teachers that guide the student, in the final part of their studies it must be the students' own questions or proposals that become the axis of their training. The point should be reached at which the student is able to formulate legal questions or objections, advance personal hypotheses as to the solution, and gradually test those hypotheses with the help of AI. In this kind of learning, what matters is no longer so much the value of the student's hypothesis as the journey that will lead them to test it —a journey that, in the end, will have brought the student to a higher level of knowledge and competence.

At any of these stages, however, learning must rest on the triangular relationship between teacher, student and AI. The teacher must formulate the initial questions, before the student has sufficient judgement of their own, and must ensure that the AI's confirmation bias —together with hallucinations, or legal solutions presented as beyond doubt when they are not— does not displace or dilute the training. Learning in which AI is used intelligently is a "tussle" between the user and the tool, and the teacher must help the student to be formed through that dialogue. That is to say, the debate and critical presentation of the findings obtained with AI must be an essential element of in-person classes, which in this way recover their full meaning. Here the role of the teacher is fundamental.

3. The structure of the curriculum

A) "Structural" subjects and electives

The curricula for the *Licenciatura* and for the law degree rested, as has been indicated, on the distinction between branches of the legal order, allocating to each area of knowledge a portion of the available time. The aim is that, over the five years of the Licenciatura or the four of the present-day Grado, the student should have had time to learn the most important rules of each part of the law. This is an approach which, as we have already stressed, proceeds from the premise that knowledge of the law is acquired through the learning of legal rules. The subjects that are not positive law are reduced to Legal History and the Philosophy or Theory of Law.

To these one might add Roman law; but it must be borne in mind that this law was indeed positive law until relatively recent times. In Catalonia, in particular, it did not cease to be so (albeit as supplementary law) until the Compilation of 1960, and in a sense it still is in Navarre. That is to say, the explanation for the presence of Roman law in the curriculum probably derives from its former character as positive law. Besides the legal subjects, others from related disciplines are sometimes included as well. In particular, it is not unusual to find subjects such as Introduction to Economics or the like.

What is proposed in this contribution departs from the foregoing scheme. The training is structured on the basis of knowledge of legal argumentation and of the major normative structures, and is then projected onto questions that are not confined by the traditional distinctions between legal areas (tax, criminal, administrative, commercial, etc.). In the early years there would be subjects such as Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, EU Law, International Law (including both Public International Law and Private International Law), Private Law, Public Law, Criminal Law and Procedural Law. These subjects should enable the student to master legal reasoning, to know the structures of rule-creation, the dynamics of legal conflict (Procedural Law) and the core elements of Criminal Law, Public Law and Private Law. The aim is to strengthen the cross-disciplinary view; that is why no distinction is drawn between civil law, commercial law and labour law, or between administrative law and tax and financial law. The idea is that a holistic knowledge of the legal phenomenon is required, one that eschews unduly rigid compartmentalisation. Probably even the distinction between Public, Private and Procedural Law already involves some kind of reductionism; but a compromise must be found between maintaining the cross-disciplinary character and the possibility of going deeper into certain specific questions.

This approach makes it possible to avoid some problems that arise at present. Thus, for example, the debate on the distinction between civil and commercial matters would be addressed simultaneously from the multiple existing perspectives, as would the relationships between commercial, civil and labour rules. As regards Public Law, the administration's power to impose penalties and its specific features in the various fields would be addressed in a comprehensive manner, which will help the student to attain a deeper knowledge of the principles that structure the law.

In the final years of the degree, the perspective changes. Here, more specific subjects would be offered, to be studied from a cross-disciplinary perspective and in considerable depth. That greater depth would be made possible by the intensive use of AI, in a manner already very close to that of the professional.

The usual elective subjects could serve as a guide for this second part of the degree. At the UAB Faculty of Law the following electives are currently offered: Bioethics, Crimes against Humanity and Human Rights, the Franco Dictatorship and the Democratic Transition, Family Law, Social Security Law, Insurance Law, Succession Law, International Trade Law, Environmental Law, European Internal Market Law, Animal Welfare and Law, Local Government Law, Maritime Law, Economic and Corporate Criminal Law, Planning Law, Fundamental Rights, Rights and Technologies in the Field of Labour Relations, criminal trials, Corporate Taxation, Gender and Law, Management of Civil Litigation, the Institutionalisation of the International System, the Political Institutions of Catalonia, Citizen Participation in the Institutions of the European Union, Personal Income Tax and Inheritance and Gift Tax, multiculturalism and religious freedom, the legal regime of labour relations in the public administrations, legal liability, legal simulation, and contemporary legal systems. To these electives is added the possibility of undertaking various external placements[40].

These subjects, currently taught, are only a part of those possible. The curriculum provides for others that have not yet been "activated". These are the following: International and Interregional Aspects of the Law of Persons, Families and Successions; Autonomous Communities, Local Authorities and the EU; International Development Cooperation; Nationality and Immigration Law; Consumer Law; Children's Law; Market Law; the Law of Regulated Sectors: Telecommunications and Energy; Transport Law; Global Law, Foundations and Principles; Law and Religions; Law and Technology; Criminal Law of Risk and Technological Crime; European Private Law; Labour Procedural Law; the Case Method: Roman Jurisprudence; the Financing of Territorial Public Bodies; International Taxation; the History of Legal Cultures; the History of Law and Institutions in Catalonia; Images of Law in Film; Introduction to Political Science; introduction to criminology; introduction to the analysis of financial statements; Peacekeeping and European Defence Policies; occupational risk prevention; criminal protection of the public service; comparative constitutional systems of the EU; Sociology of Law; Theory of the State; Judicial Protection and Family Proceedings; Judicial Protection and Alternative Dispute Resolution; and current-affairs seminars in the various areas of knowledge (administrative, civil, constitutional, labour and social security, financial and tax, private international, public international, commercial, criminal, procedural

[40] https://www.uab.cat/web/estudiar/llistat-de-graus/pla-d-estudis/guies-docents/dret-1345467811508.html?param1=1258702368123.

and Roman law; in addition to the history of law and institutions and the theory and philosophy of law)[41].

As can be seen, this list of elective subjects (which is, in all likelihood, similar to those found at other Spanish universities)[42] includes some that are highly specific and sectoral alongside others with a more interdisciplinary dimension. From the standpoint adopted here, the latter ought to be strengthened, so that each elective subject permits the analysis of a given problem or sector from a variety of perspectives. In this sense, subjects such as "Environmental Law", "Children's Law" or "Family Law" could, for example, meet this requirement —but always provided that a genuinely interdisciplinary approach is guaranteed. Thus, in Environmental Law one would have to consider both the administrative and the tax rules, take into account the international and EU-law perspective, and also its projection onto private law. In Children's Law, to give another example, it would be necessary to consider both the civil and the administrative aspects, taking into account the family dimension as well.

Certain subjects could be good candidates for the approach proposed here, but they would have to undergo certain adaptations. Thus, a genuinely multidisciplinary perspective is not possible for a subject as broad as International Trade Law, but it is possible, within it, for subjects such as "Industrial and Intellectual Property", "Company Law", "Insolvency" or "Cooperation between Undertakings". In each of these, one could go deeper into substantive questions, international jurisdiction, applicable law, taxation, the labour and social security dimension (where applicable) and even economic or business aspects.

This perspective could lead to certain changes. Thus, for example, the subject Planning Law could be reoriented towards another concerning the regime of housing, taking into account both civil aspects of ownership, tenancy and the building regime, as well as the administrative and tax dimensions.

The foregoing are merely tentative examples of where this second part of legal studies might go —oriented towards knowledge that connects directly with the problems professionals face, a perspective that eschews artificial compartmentalisation and that, today, with the use of AI, is possible.

Of course, through the choice of subjects in this second phase, the student will be able to attain a degree of specialisation. Thus, for example, one who includes among their options industrial and intellectual property, company law, insolvency and cooperation between

[41] *Ibidem*.
[42] See, for example, for the University of Barcelona (UB), the following address: https://web.ub.edu/es/web/estudis/w/grado-g1055?subjects.

undertakings will be able to acquire a good command of the sector of the legal order traditionally associated with commercial law. Deepening in children's and family law will lead to a different specialisation, and likewise one may envisage pathways that go deeper into environmental matters, into the regulation of health services and the liability associated with them, or into others focused, for example, on the field of transport and logistics. Perhaps the ideal would be for each student to be able to complete two different pathways, thus obtaining a training that combines soundness in the structural principles with sufficient specific knowledge for swift integration into the labour market. At present, however, this approach faces the difficulty that the formal specialisation pathways (menciones) must comprise at least 48 ECTS, so that completing two of them would require taking 16 elective subjects (where these are 6-ECTS subjects), which is unfeasible.

B) A proposed distribution of subjects

On the basis of the foregoing, I set out below a proposed distribution of subjects within the curriculum. It is an ideal proposal, in the sense that I am aware of the difficulties that adapting it to the regulatory constraints —and to the reality of law faculties in which the division into areas of knowledge is strict— may pose[43]. It is, moreover, a tentative proposal. I am aware that bringing about a change of this magnitude entails enormous difficulties; but I believe that at this moment we are obliged, in all honesty, to put forward a variety of approaches that may enrich the debate. The distribution of subjects that follows responds to this purpose and is consistent with what has been set out in the preceding sections.

It is true, however, that this is a proposal drawing on still limited experience of the impact of AI on teaching, in the absence of studies (which, for reasons of time, cannot yet exist) on how it is affecting students' learning process, and on the assumption that AI will improve in quality in the future without, however, undergoing a change of scale. All of these are limitations that must be borne in mind; but, for the very reason noted in the preceding paragraph, it is necessary that, in these times of change, we put forward proposals, because what is becoming ever clearer is that traditional methods require profound adaptations that cannot be deferred.

[43]For a detailed examination of the legal and regulatory constraints on the design of law curricula at present, see C. Górriz López, *loc. cit., passim*.

One further caveat: in accordance with what has been explained so far, the cross-disciplinary character must be one of the axes of legal teaching, and it must be a cross-disciplinary character that goes beyond cooperation between areas of knowledge and that seeks to enable teachers to see legal phenomena from different perspectives —which requires far more intensive communication among them than we now have. That is to say, I am aware that the curriculum I propose is demanding not only for students but also for teachers.

Even with these limitations, it seems to me worth setting out what this curriculum, adapted to the challenges of AI, might look like. I have kept four years and 240 credits (ECTS). The distribution of subjects would be as follows:

Year 1 — First semester	**ECTS**
Legal system and legal argumentation	6
State legal systems (I)	6
Criminal Law (I)	6
Legal History	6
Legal instruments	6
Year 1 — Second semester	**ECTS**
Legal argumentation and interpretation of rules	6
The international legal system	6
State legal systems (II)	6
Criminal Law (II)	6
Dispute resolution (I)	6
Year 2 — First semester	**ECTS**
Structural elements of procedural law (I)	6
The EU as a legal system	6
General Part of Private Law (I)	12
General Part of Public Law (I)	6
Year 2 — Second semester	**ECTS**
Structural elements of procedural law (II)	6
General Part of Private Law (II)	6
General Part of Public Law (II)	12
Articulation of normative plurality	6
Year 3 — First semester	**ECTS**
General Part of Private Law (III)	6
General Part of Public Law (III)	6

Elective 1	6
Elective 2	6
Elective 3	6
Year 3 — Second semester	**ECTS**
Elective 4	6
Elective 5	6
Elective 6	6
Elective 7	6
Elective 8	6
Year 4 — First semester	**ECTS**
Elective 9	6
External placement I	24
Year 4 — Second semester	**ECTS**
Final Degree Project (TFG)	6
External placement II	24

In the proposal above, two subjects not previously mentioned have been included: first, Legal History and, second, Legal Instruments. The former would be oriented towards training in the evolution of the legal phenomenon. I believe it is important to grasp that the law we now know —which, as I have already indicated, derives from codification— is not the only way of understanding normative systems. This subject would be oriented towards providing that perspective, which is not only valuable in itself but also allows a better understanding of certain features of present-day law.

The purpose of the second of these subjects would be for students to become familiar with certain tools proper to Law that are not generally known outside law faculties, nor systematically explained in other disciplines. This would include the location of legal rules through databases, the handling of doctrinal sources, the basic structure of legal writing, and the particularities of legal language. In addition, attention should be given to the identification of biases and hallucinations in the various AI tools —although this is a task that will have to be addressed in every subject.

In the final year there would also be external placements and the TFG. External placements are an important means of effecting the transition between the university and legal practice. The fact that all students are given this first contact with real practice is to be welcomed. If, moreover, they can be undertaken at two different destinations, the student will

have a more varied experience. In the first semester they would be complemented by an elective subject, and in the second by the writing of the TFG.

The proposal draws no distinction between compulsory subjects and basic-training subjects. From the standpoint of legal training, I do not believe this to be a relevant distinction. In any event, this role should be played precisely by those subjects taken in the first year, which naturally bear on the basic elements of legal training.

Finally, as regards the compulsory subjects, some observations must be made concerning the subjects "General Part of Private Law" and "General Part of Public Law". The former would correspond, grosso modo, to the subjects of civil law, commercial law and labour law. The latter, to administrative law, financial and tax law, and social security law. Both are allocated 24 credits distributed across three subjects, to be taught in the second year of the degree and the first semester of the third year. We shall not enter here into the detailed development of these subjects; but it must be stressed, as already noted, that the aim is to overcome unduly compartmentalised views, so that the relevant questions, in both public and private law, are seen in an integrated manner. Thus, for example, in studying the structural principles of contracts, the particularities of, say, consumer contracts and employment contracts must be integrated. In the field of public law, the administration's power of self-enforcement (autotutela) should be examined taking into account its manifestations across all fields, including, for example, tax matters.

As regards the elective subjects, these will depend on the particular profile of each university. In the case of the UAB, drawing on the catalogue of electives set out in the curriculum, bearing in mind the necessary pursuit of a cross-disciplinary character noted earlier, and adding some subjects that, it seems to me, might be of interest, a tentative list of elective subjects might include:

- The legal treatment of the family.
- Management of successions.
- Environment and law.
- Industrial and intellectual property.
- Corporate transactions and the establishment of companies.
- Insolvency and international insolvency.
- The legal regime of housing.
- Domestic and international sale and carriage of goods.
- Cooperation agreements between undertakings.
- Free competition and unfair competition.
- Risk and liability.
- Domestic and international protection of the consumer.
- The legal regime of minors.

- Domestic and international protection of human rights.
- Armed conflicts and the violation of fundamental rights.
- The regulation and integration of foreign nationals.
- The management of public services.
- The power of the administrations to impose penalties.
- Individual and collective protection of workers.
- Management of social security benefits.
- Tax planning for individuals.
- Tax planning for legal persons.
- Enforcement of judicial decisions and public documents.
- Domestic and international means of payment.
- The fight against terrorism and money laundering.
- Freedom of expression and hate speech.
- Gender and law.
- Filiation, the right to reproduce and assisted reproduction techniques.
- Investment and financial markets.
- The legal treatment of animals.

This is, of course, a tentative list, but one that seeks to show what the profile of the elective subjects ought to be in accordance with what has been argued throughout: questions that require a cross-disciplinary treatment, calling for the consideration of different branches of Law, with practical interest but, at the same time, with formative capacity, in that they raise the need to go deeper into legal interpretation and argumentation, on the one hand, and into the articulation of different rules, on the other. It is to be taken for granted that in every case both the purely domestic situations (where such a situation is possible, according to the nature of the subject) and the international ones will be considered.

The essential cross-disciplinary character of both the elective and the compulsory subjects entails demands on teachers as well. An effort will be required to venture into fields that go beyond each individual's strict specialisation. This is a situation that is not unusual in other countries, but that in Spain runs up against the rigid division into areas of knowledge. As anticipated earlier, AI can facilitate this extension of capabilities, but it will, of course, require study, an open mind, and cooperation with other teachers. It can also make it easier for teachers with a cross-disciplinary profile to teach the new subjects. Thus, for example, it is well known that Roman-law scholars have a very good general grounding in private law, which would make them ideal teachers for the general part of private law. In any event, those teachers who have moved in "border" areas would be better prepared for the demands of this new teaching.

IV. Conclusion

The arrival of AI is already transforming the teaching and learning of law. The proposal made here is to accept the need for a transformation of teaching oriented towards drawing the greatest possible benefit from AI tools. These are to be seen as levers, such that the greater the student's legal knowledge and competence in the use of AI, the better the results. The teaching of law must be oriented towards strengthening this knowledge and these competences in students.

To achieve the foregoing, it will be necessary to centre the degree on knowledge of the normative structures, on mastery of legal argumentation, and on the adoption of the specific way of thinking of jurists. To this end, a curriculum is proposed in which there are subjects whose object is the analysis of legal interpretation and argumentation, together with others that explain rule-creation at the domestic as well as the European (EU) and international levels, in addition to the articulation of normative plurality (what is known as private international law). These subjects will be taught essentially in the first two years of the degree and will make it possible to proceed to the study of the general parts of private law and public law, concluding with the elective subjects, which would be intended to deepen specific questions, in an interdisciplinary manner, at a level of demand equivalent to that of the profession.

The whole approach proceeds from the essential interdisciplinarity of the training, which will also be a demand on the teaching staff, who must be capable of venturing beyond the placid gardens of their own specialisation into neighbouring fields.

As regards assessment, it is necessary to place oral examinations at the centre, for they are the ones that best allow the true level of competence attained by students to be gauged.